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I. INTRODUCTION
Almost a decade ago, the California Supreme Court endorsed
the use of public nuisance injunctions as a means to control street
gangs.1 Public nuisance injunctions against gangs ("gang injunctions"),
which result from civil suits filed by district or city attorneys, prohibit
the nuisance conduct within a prescribed geographical area, focusing
on the "turf' claimed by the gang.2 In People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, the
California Supreme Court upheld an injunction against thirty-eight
named members of a San Jose gang in a four square block area where
none of the gang members lived. 3 The court described the
neighborhood as "an occupied territory" and its residents as "prisoners
in their own homes."4 To resolve the public nuisance posed by the
gang, the Acuna injunction contained a controversial provision
prohibiting gang members from publicly associating with each other.
The California Supreme Court declared the provision constitutional;
such provisions are now common in gang injunctions. 5 Gang
injunctions today also frequently limit otherwise legal behavior
beyond public association, such as being out after dark, possession of
various objects, making gang-related hand signals, and wearing gang
1. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 605-607 (Cal. 1997).
2. EDWARD L. ALLAN, CIVIL GANG ABATEMENT: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
POLICING BY INJUNCTION 77 (2004).
3. 929 P.2d at 601-603.
4. Id. at 601.
5. E.g., People v. Varrio Lamparas Primera, No.1148758 at 2-3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 30,
2005), available at http://www.sbcourts.org/general-info/decisions/O22706Permlnjunction
VLP.pdf [hereinafter "Westside Injunction"] (amended preliminary injunction); People ex rel.
Totten v. Colonia Chiques, No. CIV 226032 at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 1, 2005), available at
http://da.countyofventura.org/coch/COCH-Perm%20Inj%206-1-05.PDF [hereinafter "Colonia
Chiques Injunction"] (amended judgment for permanent injunction).
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colors.6 Many of the substantive constitutional rights issues raised by
Acuna have been critiqued by commentators, 7 but numerous gang
injunctions have been imposed since Acuna was decided.8 Two distinct
developments in gang injunction usage warrant deeper examination
than existing scholarship provides.
The geographical areas covered by gang injunctions have
expanded since the four square block injunction upheld in Acuna.9 In a
1998 case, In re Englebrecht,10 a California appellate court upheld an
injunction covering approximately one square mile that included some
gang members' residences.1" In 2005, Judge Frederick Bysshe of the
Ventura County Superior Court entered an injunction in the city of
Oxnard, California against the Colonia Chiques gang. The Colonia
Chiques injunction covers 6.6 square miles, which constitutes 24% of
the city.12 This injunction's geographic scope significantly limits the
liberties of gang members because they must travel farther to escape
the injunction's strictures. The growth of areas being enjoined raises
questions of proof: what must the government establish in order to
secure an injunction, and how should the boundaries of an enjoined
area be determined? It also raises questions about the interplay
between constitutional protections and traditional equitable limits on
6. E.g., People v. Englebrecht, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738, 742 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
(enjoining public association, drinking alcoholic beverages, possessing weapons including bats
and glass bottles, warning others of the approach of police officers, making hand signs to refer to
the gang, and minors from being in public between 10 p.m. and sunrise).
7. E.g., Gregory S. Walston, Taking the Constitution at its Word: A Defense of the Use of
Anti-Gang Injunctions, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 47, 49-53 (1999); Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Note,
Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public Nuisance Abatement Injunctions Against Urban
Street Gangs, 51 STAN. L. REV. 409, 411-12 (1999); Rebecca Allen, Note, People ex rel. Gallo v.
Acuna: (Ab)using California's Nuisance Law to Control Gangs, 25 W. ST. U. L. REV. 257, 259-61
(1998); Gary Stewart, Note, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial Hegemony
in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249, 2250-52 (1998); see also Christopher S. Yoo,
Comment, The Constitutionality of Enjoining Criminal Street Gangs as Public Nuisances, 89 Nw.
U. L. REV. 212, 225-266 (1994) (surveying the constitutional issues at stake in gang injunctions
generally).
8. Press Release, Office of the Los Angeles City Attorney, City Attorney Rocky Delgadillo
Announces Injunction Against Notorious Big Hazard Gang (Aug. 16, 2005), available at
http://www.lacity.org/atty/attypress/attyattypress6931721-08162005.pdf (noting that in the City
of Los Angeles alone, the use of gang injunctions expanded from eight in 2001 to twenty-six in
2005).
9. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 608 (Cal. 1997).
10. In re Englebrecht (Englebrecht 1), 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (litigation
over the preliminary injunction). A related case, People v. Englebrecht, delved into different
issues arising from the permanent injunction, which was substantially the same. People v.
Englebrecht (Englebrecht II), 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738 (Cal Ct. App. 2001). References to the
injunction underlying both cases will be "Englebrecht."
11. Englebrecht I, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91, 95-96.
12. Fred Alvarez, Permanent Gang Order Is Urged, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2005, at B1.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
courts' injunctive powers: how do these constrain the scope of gang
injunctions? This Note will first address these questions regarding the
expansion of areas being enjoined.
The Colonia Chiques injunction deviated in another way from
prior injunctions upheld in California courts: it was issued against the
Colonia Chiques as an unincorporated association, rather than
naming individual gang members as defendants. 13 Following Judge
Bysshe's lead in the Colonia Chiques case, Judge James Iwasko
entered an injunction against the Southside and Westside gangs in
Lompoc, California as unincorporated associations, without naming
individual defendants.1 4 In 2006, Judge Vincent O'Neill issued a
preliminary injunction against the Southside Chiques gang, an
Oxnard rival to the Colonia Chiques, without naming individual
defendants. 15 Refusing to name individual defendants is the second
new development that this Note will address. Because unnamed
defendants receive no notice that the injunctions are being considered,
procedural due process concerns become severe when individual
defendants are not named. Moreover, gangs themselves are not
structured such that a leader speaks for the group and could respond
in court. 16
This Note argues that even if past gang injunctions upheld by
California courts did not violate gang members' constitutional rights,
these two new trends in the use of public nuisance injunctions as a
means of gang control are equitably and constitutionally problematic.
These injunctions are problematic because they: (1) expand the
geographical scope of injunctions without demanding rigorous proof of
nuisance activity and without regard for burdens on gang members'
associational rights, and (2) name defendant gangs as unincorporated
associations with no named individual defendants. Because there is no
appellate case law on gang injunctions in other states, this Note will
focus exclusively on California law, along with federal constitutional
principles.
Part II of this Note examines the conceptual and doctrinal
foundations of public nuisance gang injunctions. Part III analyzes the
heightened equitable and constitutional concerns associated with
13. Colonia Chiques Injunction, supra note 5, at 1.
14. Westside Injunction, supra note 5 at 1.
15. Raul Hernandez, Injunction Ordered Against the Southside Chiques Gang, VENTURA
COUNTY STAR, Sept. 19, 2006, at Al.
16. See DEBORAH LAMM WEISEL, CONTEMPORARY GANGS: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 51
(2002) ("[M]ost gangs appear to lack or have a very weak orientation toward achieving goals
and... appear to lack or have a very loose hierarchical structure, have unstable leadership, few
rules and little role specialization.").
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injunctions that are broad in geographic scope. Part IV then
investigates the separate problem of how suits brought against gangs
as unincorporated associations without naming individual defendants
abridge unnamed gang members' procedural due process rights.
Finally, Part V concludes that the geographic scope of injunctions is
an important consideration when weighing their impact on gang
members' substantive liberties and that bringing public nuisance suits
against gangs as unincorporated associations without naming
individual defendants poses insurmountable procedural due process
problems requiring abolition of that practice.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Before analyzing particular equitable and constitutional
aspects of gang injunctions, it is important to understand their legal
foundation and origins. Section A explores the underpinnings of public
nuisance law in California and injunction as a nuisance remedy.
Section B examines the law of unincorporated associations in
California and the equitable reach of who may be enjoined. Section C
then provides background information on the California Supreme
Court's substantive constitutional analysis of the prohibition on gang
members' public association in Acuna, before Section D investigates
how appellate courts applied the principles of Acuna to the subsequent
cases Englebrecht I and II.
A. The Common Law of Nuisance in California and the Equitable
Remedy of Injunction
Nuisance initially arose as a civil action in the equity courts as
a way to prevent infringement on the enjoyment of property rights.17
"Public nuisance" has been defined by statute in California since
1872.18 According to the California Civil Code, a nuisance is
[a]nything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of
controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction of the
free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property,
or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any ...
public park, square, street, or highway .... 19
17. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 603 (Cal. 1997).
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 (West 1997).
19. Id. § 3479. Alternatively, the Penal Code defines a public nuisance as "[a]nything which
is injurious to health, or is indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of
property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by an entire
community or neighborhood, or by any considerable number of persons, or unlawfully obstructs
the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any ... public park, square, street or
2006] 1697
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A public nuisance is a nuisance that affects an entire
community or neighborhood. 20 The remedies for public nuisance are
indictment or information, a civil action, or abatement. 21 A district
attorney or city attorney may bring a civil action in the name of the
people of the State of California to abate a public nuisance in his
jurisdiction.22 In addition to civil penalties, the California Penal Code
considers the maintenance of a public nuisance to be a misdemeanor. 23
The United States Supreme Court illumined the basic remedial
principles of public nuisance law in In re Debs,24 asserting that the
ability of courts "to interfere [with public nuisances] by injunction is
one recognized from ancient times and by indubitable authority. '"25
According to the Supreme Court in Debs,
[t]he difference between a public nuisance and a private nuisance is that one affects the
people at large and the other simply the individual. The quality of the wrongs is the
same, and the jurisdiction of the courts over them rests upon the same principles and
goes to the same extent .... The power [of the court] to interfere exists in all cases of
nuisance.
2 6
Injunctions are equitable in nature, so they generally will not
be granted to those who have an adequate remedy at law.2 7 The court's
ability to enjoin actions as nuisances, however, is not diminished if
these actions are also prosecutable crimes in their own right.28 Indeed,
neither is the court's ability to punish the underlying crime
diminished just because an injunction has been imposed: "[T]he
penalty for a violation of injunction is no substitute for and no defense
to a prosecution for any criminal offenses committed in the course of
such violation. '29 A public nuisance injunction itself may be viewed as
a quasi-criminal remedy because, although the imposition of the
injunction is a civil proceeding, it is enforced through the court's
highway...." CAL. PENAL CODE § 370 (West 1999). Because gang members often congregate on
sidewalks and streets, the obstruction provision of the statute can be a key to finding a gang is a
public nuisance. See infra text accompanying notes 62 and 72-73.
20. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 (West 1997).
21. Id. § 3491.
22. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 731 (West 1980); CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 26528 (West 1988).
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 372 (West 1999).
24. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
25. Id. at 599.
26. Id. at 592-93 (punctuation altered for grammatical consistency).
27. Id. at 583.
28. Id. at 593. "The mere fact that an act is criminal does not divest the jurisdiction of
equity to prevent it by injunction, if it be also a violation of property rights, and the party
aggrieved has no other adequate remedy for the prevention of the irreparable injury which will
result from the failure or inability of a court of law to redress such rights." Id. at 593-94.
29. Id. at 599-600.
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contempt powers. 30 A person is in contempt of court if he willfully
disobeys a court order.3' The court can then impose either civil or
criminal penalties. 32 At the time an injunction is considered and
instated, no right to appointed counsel for the defendant attaches. 33
Generally, a defendant's right to appointed counsel exists "only where
the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation,"34
which, in the gang injunction context, occurs at a criminal contempt
trial for violation of the injunction.
According to People v. Lim, the 1941 landmark California
public nuisance case, legislatures have the power to define "public
nuisance" to include activity not otherwise considered a nuisance at
common law or to include activity that offends public policy. 35 The
courts, in contrast, cannot by themselves enjoin activities merely
contrary to public policy without a statutory prohibition on which to
rely. 36 The California Supreme Court in Lim was reluctant to allow
courts to "broaden the field in which injunctions against criminal
activity will be granted."37
For a court to issue an injunction against a public nuisance, the
petition for relief must allege specific facts demonstrating that the
defendant was engaged in nuisance; conclusory statements that a
public nuisance exists are insufficient. 38 Despite the Lim court's
reluctance to unilaterally expand the definition of public nuisance,39 it
liberally construed the general statutory definition to conclude that
the complaint at issue alleged facts sufficient to find that a public
nuisance potentially existed.40 It is through such broad construction of
30. Contempt of court is a misdemeanor under the California Penal Code, punishable by up
to one year in jail or $5000 fine, or both. CAL. PENAL CODE § 166(a)(4), (b)(1) (West 1999).
31. Id. § 166(a)(4).
32. Id. § 166(b)(1).
33. Iraheta v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
34. Id. at 476.
35. 118 P.2d 472, 475 (Cal. 1941).
36. Id. at 474.
37. Id. at 477.
38. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 598 (1895); Lim, 118 P.2d at 477.
39. The District Attorney sought to have a gambling establishment, traditionally a public
nuisance at common law (but not expressly included in the statutory definition), enjoined. Lim,
118 P.2d 472 at 473. The Court refused to decree that all gambling establishments were
nuisances but found that the "crowds of disorderly people [attending the gambling house] who
disturb the peace and obstruct the traffic may well impair the free enjoyment of life and
property," thus fitting the general statutory definition of public nuisance. Id. at 477. A key basis
for gang injunctions is the tendency of gangs to congregate and obstruct sidewalks. See infra text
accompanying notes 62 and 72-73.
40. Id. at 478. The appeal was from a demurrer, so the question the court addressed was
whether sufficient facts were alleged to potentially conclude that a public nuisance existed, not
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the nuisance statute that California courts have determined that gang
activity falls within the statutory definition.41
B. Unincorporated Associations and the Limits of Who May Be
Enjoined
Historically, unincorporated associations could not sue or be
sued in their own name in the absence of an authorizing statute
because they were not legally recognized entities. 42 California,
however, has such an authorizing statute. 43 The members of
unincorporated associations can also be joined as parties to the
action.44 Representation of an unincorporated association in court
must comport with the rules governing representation of
corporations-specifically, a corporation must appear through an
agent because it is a distinct legal entity.45 Furthermore, a layperson
may not represent an unincorporated association because such
representation would constitute the unlawful practice of law. 46
The modern test to determine whether an entity is an
unincorporated association asks whether the entity's members (1)
share a common purpose, and (2)(a) function under a common name
(b) under circumstances where fairness requires that the group be
recognized as a legal entity. 47 Fairness requires recognition of the
association when people interacting with it allege that their legal
rights have been violated. 48 Historically, labor unions, political
parties, social clubs, religious organizations, environmental societies,
athletic organizations, condominium owners, lodges, stock exchanges,
and veterans have all been recognized as unincorporated
associations. 49
whether there was adequate proof of those facts to conclude whether a nuisance actually existed.
Id. at 477.
41. See, e.g., People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 601 (Cal. 1997) (describing how
gang members "take over sidewalks, driveways, carports, apartment parking areas, and impede
traffic on the public thoroughfares to conduct their drive-up drug bazaar").
42. Jardine v. Superior Court, 2 P.2d 756, 759 (Cal. 1931).
43. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 369.5 (West 2006).
44. Id.
45. Clean Air Transp. Sys. v. San Mateo County Transit Dist., 243 Cal. Rptr. 799, 800 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1988).
46. Id.
47. Barr v. United Methodist Church, 153 Cal. Rptr. 322, 327-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
48. Id. at 328.
49. Id. at 327.
1700 [Vol. 59:5:1693
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Gangs have also been tacitly recognized as unincorporated
associations in California. 50 Gangs generally operate under a common
name, 51 fulfilling part of the second prong of the test. The remaining
part of the second prong is fulfilled when gangs are sued for public
nuisance because the government alleges that the public's rights have
been violated. Whether gangs fulfill the first prong is less clear, but
the typical gang probably does have a common purpose, whether to
establish and protect turf, provide a network of social support, or
engage in criminal activity. 52
Although recognition as an unincorporated association means
that a gang is a legally distinct entity from its members, case law
allows an injunction directed at an unincorporated association to be
effective against its members nonetheless. 53 This contrasts with suits
for damages, in which liability would be limited to association assets.54
Orders enjoining the behavior of people through whom the enjoined
party might attempt to act traditionally have been upheld, even when
the enjoined party was not an unincorporated association.55 The
court's powers to enjoin those who are not party to a given suit are
necessarily broad to "prevent the prohibited action by persons acting
in concert with or in support of the claim of the enjoined party, who
are in fact his aiders and abettors."56 However, the court's powers do
have limits. Injunctions that purport to apply to all persons with
actual notice of the injunction-regardless of whether or not those
persons are acting in concert with or on behalf of those enjoined-have
been struck down as overbroad.57
50. See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 618 (Cal. 1997) ("[T]he City could have
named the gangs themselves as defendants .... ") (emphasis in original).
51. Indeed, under the California Street Terrorism and Enforcement and Prevention (STEP)
Act, having a common name is a defining characteristic of a gang. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(f)
(West 2006).
52. See Jerome H. Skolnick et al., Gang Organization and Migration, in GANGS: THE
ORIGINS AND IMPACT OF CONTEMPORARY YOUTH GANGS IN THE UNITED STATES 193, 194-95 (Scott
Cummings ed., 1993) (asserting that Southern California gangs stress "values of neighborhood,
loyalty, and the equality that one obtains among members of a family"); see also California Street
Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(f) (West 1999) (defining
"criminal street gang").
53. Berger v. Superior Court, 167 P. 143, 144 (Cal. 1917).
54. Fazzi v. Peters, 440 P.2d 242, 246 (Cal. 1968) ("As a general rule the judgment in an
action... bound only the partnership property and was not enforceable against the individual
property of partners not joined as individual defendants and served with process as such.").
55. Berger, 167 P. at 144. For example, "agents, servants, employees, aiders, abettors, etc.,
though not parties to the action" have all been included in injunctions. Id.
56. Id.
57. Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Garibaldi, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 53-54 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003). "If the person charged with violation [of the injunction] was neither named in the
injunction individually or as a member of a class, nor as aiding or abetting a person so included,
2006] 1701
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C. People ex. rel. Gallo v. Acuna: Gangs Held to be an Enjoinable
Public Nuisance
In People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, the leading case on gang
injunctions, 58 the California Supreme Court upheld a public nuisance
injunction against thirty-eight named members of a San Jose gang
known as VST.59 The gang as an association was not named as a
defendant. 60 Asserting that the neighborhood in question was an
"urban war zone," the court described a laundry list of shocking and
illegal activity before concluding, "The people of this community are
prisoners in their own homes."61 The injunction governed a four
square block area known as Rocksprings, in which gang members
congregated--often obstructing the streets-but in which none of the
gang members lived.62 The two challenged provisions of the injunction,
paragraphs (a) and (k), included prohibitions on gang members
associating publicly 63 and intimidating people in Rocksprings. 64 The
California Supreme Court upheld both provisions against several
constitutional challenges. 65 Discussion of Acuna in this Note will be
limited to the provision banning public association.
When the court addressed a freedom of association challenge to
paragraph (a) of the injunction, it noted that there is no "generalized
he cannot be brought within the prohibition merely by being served with a copy of the writ." Id.
at 52.
58. 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Gonzalez v. Gallo, 521 U.S. 1121 (1997).
Because the United States Supreme Court declined to hear this case, Acuna is the leading
authority in the nation on gang injunctions. Furthermore, no other state supreme courts have
addressed the issue. Discussion and analysis of Acuna will be somewhat simplified, focusing
primarily on provisions that prohibit public association.
59. 929 P.2d at 601.
60. Id.
61. Id. The court narrated particular instances of behavior: "The community has become a
staging area for gang-related violence and a dumping ground for the weapons and
instrumentalities of crime once the deed is done. Area residents have had their garages used as
urinals, their homes commandeered as escape routes; their walls, fences, garage doors,
sidewalks, and even their vehicles turned into a sullen canvas of gang graffiti." Id.
62. Id. at 602.
63. Id. at 608. Paragraph (a) of the preliminary injunction enjoined the defendants from
"standing, sitting, walking, driving, gathering or appearing anywhere in public view with any
other defendant... or with any other known [VST] member." Id.
64. Id. at 613. Paragraph (k) of the preliminary injunction enjoined the defendants from
"confronting, intimidating, annoying, harassing, threatening, challenging, provoking, assaulting
and/or battering any residents or patrons, or visitors to 'Rocksprings'. . . known to have
complained about gang activities." Id.
65. The Court of Appeal had overturned fifteen of the twenty-four provisions of the
injunction on appeal, but the City of San Jose sought review of just two provisions by the
California Supreme Court. Id. at 602.
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right of social association" under the Constitution. 66 Rather, protected
associational interests fall into two categories: intimate associations
and associational interests that are instrumental to religious and
politically expressive activity.67 Intimate associations are generally
"distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree
of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and
seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship."68
Instrumental associations are those in which people associate "in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational,
religious, and cultural ends" that are protected by the First
Amendment. 69 Refusing to "mechanically applyo and tick[] off'
characteristics of intimate associations, the Acuna court concluded
that the gang did not qualify for First Amendment protection under
this category because it did not "inculcate[] and nourish[] civilization's
fundamental values."70 The court further decided that because the
gang members were not engaging in protected politically expressive or
religious activity in Rocksprings, they did not deserve instrumental
associational protection. 7'
Ultimately, the Acuna court held that the gang members'
conduct as described in the declarations supporting the injunction
(including violent behavior, use of drugs in public, obstruction of
sidewalks and streets, and vandalism) 72 met the statutory definition of
public nuisance as interpreted by People v. Lim.7 3 The court further
held that the injunction burdened "no more speech than necessary to
serve a significant government interest," the constitutional standard
of scrutiny announced by the United States Supreme Court in Madsen
v. Women's Health Center, Inc. for incidental infringements on First
Amendment rights. 74 It reasoned that the injunction merely was
66. Id. at 608 (citing Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989) (internal quotations omitted)).
67. Id. at 608. "Intimate association" is sometimes referred to as "associational privacy;"
"instrumental association" is sometimes known as "associational speech" or "expressive
association." This Note will use the terms "intimate" and "instrumental" in order to be consistent
with the California Supreme Court's denominations in Acuna.
68. Id. (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984)).
69. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
70. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 609.
71. Id. at 608-09.
72. Id. at 601, 614.
73. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3479-80 (West 1997); Acuna, 929 P.2d at 614; Lim, 118 P.2d 472, 475
(Cal. 1941).
74. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 614 (citing Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765
(1994)). The Madsen Court expressly applied the "no more speech than necessary" test only to
speech. 512 U.S. at 765. However, the California Supreme Court in Acuna applied the test to
instrumental association as well. 929 P.2d at 616. It is unclear from Madsen's limited discussion
of association whether such an application is appropriate. See 512 U.S. at 776 (rejecting a
2006] 1703
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intended to stop collective conduct by the gang "in a specific and
narrowly described neighborhood." 75 The court reasoned correctly, if
broadly, that preventing gang members from associating at all
prevents them from collectively engaging in nuisance behavior. The
need for such an inclusive prohibition will be challenged in Part III.D.
D. The Englebrecht Cases: Broadening the Scope of Gang Injunctions
Two related cases arose out of a 1997 gang injunction in
Oceanside, California, against members of the Posole gang. The first
case, In re Englebrecht ("Englebrecht I"), was based on the
preliminary injunction. It ruled on challenges to an associational
provision, similar to that in the injunction appealed in Acuna, and to a
provision prohibiting the use of beepers or pagers.76 The second case,
People v. Englebrecht ("Englebrecht II"), based on the permanent
injunction, decided issues of jury trial rights, standard of proof,
familial associational rights, and prohibitions on "throwing" gang
signs (making hand signals) and wearing gang-associated clothing. 77
The injunction named twenty-eight individuals, including
Englebrecht, and fifty Does. 78 It covered a sixty square block area, 79 or
approximately one square mile80 -significantly larger than the four
square block injunction in Acuna.Si This Section will examine how the
California Court of Appeal applied the Acuna case to the associational
interest challenges in Englebrecht.8 2
The non-association provision of the Englebrecht injunction
was virtually identical to the provision upheld by the California
Supreme Court in Acuna.8 3 In Englebrecht I, Englebrecht argued that
the provision nonetheless should be struck down for two reasons: (1)
the injunction covered a significantly larger geographic area than that
challenge to the injunction grounded on freedom of association as guaranteed by the First
Amendment).
75. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 615.
76. In re Englebrecht (Englebrecht 1), 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 92 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
77. People v. Englebrecht (Englebrecht 1H), 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738, 744, 750, 756-58 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001).
78. Englebrecht I, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91.
79. Id. at 91 n.i.
80. Englebrecht II, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 742.
81. People ex. rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 601 (Cal. 1997).
82. Like this Note's review of Acuna, analysis of Englebrecht will be limited to the issues
most relevant to this Note.
83. The Englebrecht provision prohibited defendants, while in the target area, from
"[s]tanding, sitting, walking, driving, bicycling, gathering or appearing anywhere in public view
with any other defendant herein, or with any other known Posole member .... Englebrecht I, 79
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92 n.3.
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in Acuna, and (2) some of the enjoined gang members lived in the
target area or had relatives who did.8 4 The Court of Appeal rejected
both arguments, concluding that "[w]hat matters is whether the
Target Area in this case burdened no more speech than necessary to
serve a significant government interest. 8 5 The court cited Acuna,
asserting that its ruling was necessary on stare decisis grounds.8 6
Englebrecht raised these arguments again, in a slightly different form,
in Englebrecht II, still to no avail.8 7
With regard to Englebrecht's geographical argument, the
Englebrecht I court noted that the target area covered only the gang's
turf, where it was public nuisance, and that the area was "well defined
by distinct boundaries-highways and major streets."88 The court
further pointed out that there was no showing that the target area
was larger than necessary to abate the public nuisance,8 9 seemingly
implying that the defendant bore the burden of proof to show that the
area of the injunction exceeded the area of the nuisance.
The Englebrecht I court also rejected Englebrecht's argument
that the injunction burdened gang members' familial relationships
because some gang members lived in the area or had relatives there:
"[T]he fact that some Posole gang members live or have relatives who
live in the Target Area does not transform their gang activities into
'intimate' or 'intrinsic' associational activities .... The familial nexus
is not carte blanche for creating a public nuisance."90
In Englebrecht II, the defendant altered his approach slightly,
arguing that because many gang members are related to each other
and live in the target area, "the injunction's associational restrictions
not only forbid gang gatherings but also constitutionally protected
family gatherings as well."91 The appellate panel that heard
Englebrecht If rejected this reformulation of the argument, asserting
that
[w]hile the injunction may place some burden on family contact in the target area, it by
no means has, in our view, a fundamental impact on general family association. [ ] Any
attempt to limit the familial associational impact of the injunction would make it a less
effective device for dealing with the collective nature of gang activity.
9 2
84. Id. at 95.
85. Id. (internal citations omitted).
86. Id.
87. Englebrecht II, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756-758.
88. Englebrecht I, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 96.
91. People v. Englebrecht (Englebrecht I), 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738, 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
92. Id. at 758.
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The permanent injunction at issue in Englebrecht II differed
from the preliminary injunction in Englebrecht I in a notable way: it
awkwardly exempted from its associational ban "named defendants
living in the target area ... who are father and sons/daughters,
mothers/sons/daughters .... -"93 Even though this provision
strengthened the court's argument regarding the injunction's slight
burden on familial association, the court failed to address the
exception in its decision. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the
injunction did not impermissibly burden Englebrecht's associational
rights.94
III. THE PROBLEM OF EXPANDED GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE
A. The Two Sets of Limits on Geographic Scope
Equitable principles and the Constitution each independently
limit the geographic area on which gang injunctions may be imposed.
A larger geographic area covered by an injunction necessarily results
in a larger burden on the liberties of gang members because they must
travel farther to engage in the enjoined activities lawfully in public.
Equitable and constitutional principles also limit the breadth of the
conduct prohibited by injunctions, which in turn affects how much
injunctions burden those they govern. When no constitutional rights
are burdened by injunction provisions, an injunction's outer bounds (in
terms of both proscribed conduct and geographic scope) will be
determined by equity. However, when constitutional rights are
implicated by an injunction, those rights demand protection even in
the absence of limiting equitable principles.
Although this Part primarily focuses on the problem of
expanded geographic scope, the scope of the activities prohibited by an
injunction is important to consider when analyzing an injunction's
equitable and constitutional validity. The solution to constitutional or
equitable problems aggravated by broad geographic scope might not
be found in shrinking the area enjoined, but rather in easing an
injunction's strictures on prohibited activities by more narrowly
defining those activities. Section B of this Part analyzes issues of proof
and the inherent equitable limitations on the scope of injunctions.
Section C then examines the underlying constitutional limits that may
restrict geographic scope. Finally, Section D suggests how courts
93. Id. at 742 n.2.
94. Id. at 760.
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should examine the problem of geographic scope in terms of these
equitable and constitutional limits.
B. Issues of Proof and Equitable Limits on Injunction Scope
A basic principle of equity is that the remedy must be
proportional to the right that has been infringed, because remedies
are a means of effecting substantive rights. 95 Judges have great
flexibility when drafting injunctions, so there is always a risk that
injunctions may be drawn too narrowly, thereby under-compensating
the plaintiff for her abridged right, or be drawn too broadly, going far
beyond the plaintiffs right.96 When establishing the geographic scope
of public nuisance gang injunctions, courts must consider whether the
district attorney has adequately proved that the gang is a public
nuisance throughout the entire area in which it seeks to enjoin
conduct. If an injunction's area is drawn too widely, it should be struck
down.
The standard of proof that the government must meet in order
to secure an injunction constrains the area covered. The burden is on
the government to prove the existence of a nuisance throughout the
target area. 97 An injunction can only run to the extent of the
nuisance.98 The California Court of Appeal's decision in Englebrecht II
requires that the government prove its case by clear and convincing
evidence when seeking a gang injunction because important rights are
implicated. 99 Even though the typical standard of proof in a civil
action is a preponderance of the evidence, the court noted that this
standard may be raised when "particularly important individual
interests or rights are at stake."100 The standard of proof demanded
suggests how much certainty society requires in order to resolve a
95. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 27 (2d ed. 1993).
96. Id. at 115.
97. See Englebrecht II, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 752-53 (establishing the burden and standard of
proving nuisance).
98. See generally DOBBS, supra note 95, at 115 ("If remedies should enforce rights, then the
tailoring stage should shape the remedy to reflect the rights in question, subject only to practical
constraints.").
99. 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 752-53. After determining this heightened burden of proof was
necessary, the appellate court refused to review questions of evidentiary sufficiency in
Englebrecht's case because he had been released from the strictures of the injunction by the time
the appeal was considered. Id. at 753 n.7; ALLAN, supra note 2, at 253 n.41.
100. Id. at 751 (citing In re Marriage of Peters, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 493, 495 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997)); e.g., People ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros. Santa Ana Theater, 180 Cal. Rptr. 728, 730
(Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that the standard of proof for obscenity as public nuisance is clear
and convincing evidence because of the importance of the rights involved).
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particular question of fact.10 1 The Englebrecht II court concluded that
a "clear and convincing" standard for a gang injunction "arises not
because the personal activities enjoined are sublime or grand but
rather because they are commonplace, and ordinary. While it may be
lawful to restrict such activity, it is also extraordinary. The
government . . . [must] firmly establisho the facts making such
restrictions necessary." 10 2
Equitable constraints on injunctions operate even when there
is no constitutionally protected activity at stake. In Englebrecht I and
Englebrecht II, the California Court of Appeal ultimately rejected
arguments that the enjoined area was too large, concluding in
Englebrecht II that the injunction's associational restrictions were
"nonfamilial, nonpolitical and nonreligious," and thus not protected in
any way by the Constitution. 103 Consider the consequences of taking
the Englebrecht cases at their word. For the sake of argument, let us
accept the premise that the injunction did not abridge constitutionally
protected forms of association. If we follow this logic to its extreme,
even an injunction covering the entire territory of the United States
would not be unconstitutional on associational grounds because no
protected associations would be burdened. 10 4 If a court could be
persuaded that a gang created a public nuisance wherever any of its
members associated, 10 5 then gang members effectively could be barred
from all public association without a constitutional problem. 0 6 Only
the equitable limitations on the court's power to enjoin nuisances
would curtail the geographic scope of the injunction.
Despite the power and flexibility of injunctions, 10 7 inherent
equitable limits on the geographical breadth of an injunction would
101. Englebrecht II, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 750 (citing In re Marriage of Peters, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 495).
102. Id. at 753.
103. Id. at 757; In re Englebrecht (Englebrecht 1), 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 95 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998).
104. Although the injunction would still be subject to substantive due process constitutional
analysis, it would receive only highly deferential "rational basis" scrutiny in the absence of
protected associational rights.
105. For example, a court might reason that two gang members from Oceanside, CA
standing on a sidewalk side by side have just as much potential to obstruct it or to act in concert
for nefarious purposes in Aurora, Illinois or Bangor, Maine as they would in Oceanside.
106. Even jurisdictional boundaries would not strictly limit the court's ability to impose such
a hypothetical injunction-there is no per se bar to an injunction prohibiting action in a foreign
jurisdiction. ROBERT S. THOMPSON & JOHN A. SEBERT, JR., REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY AND
RESTITUTION 487 (2d ed. 1989). Of course, enforcement of such an injunction may be, practically
speaking, impossible.
107. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) ("Injunctions ... can
be tailored by a trial judge to afford more precise relief than a statute where a violation of the
law has already occurred.").
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prevent the prior hypothetical injunction from ever occurring. Because
equitable remedies find their root in the English chancery courts,
which were courts of conscience, a court considering an injunction
must balance the hardships to the parties involved.108 An injunction
covering more territory than a district or city attorney's jurisdiction
would likely fail this balancing test because residents of the
jurisdiction only have a concrete interest in preventing gang
association in their community. An injunction that reaches beyond the
afflicted neighborhood would place a greater burden on gang members
with no concomitant benefit to area residents. 10 9 Furthermore, an
injunction will issue only if the defendant has violated or imminently
will violate the law and there is a "cognizable danger of recurrent
violation."110 Proving a cognizable danger of recurrent violation in a
vast area like our nationwide hypothetical situation is virtually
impossible, because gangs are generally locally territorial.1
These tripartite requirements of balancing hardships of the
parties, meeting a heightened standard of proof of nuisance, and
proving a cognizable risk of recurrent violation of residents' rights act
to limit the legitimate geographic scope of the injunction to the area
directly affected by the gang's nuisance activity. If an injunction's
terms do not restrict constitutionally protected activity, only these
equitable limitations on an injunction's geographic scope will apply.
However, as the following Section argues, associational restrictions
may well burden protected constitutional rights, notwithstanding the
contrary conclusions of the Acuna and Englebrecht courts.
C. Associational Provisions and Constitutional Limits on Injunction
Scope
Constitutional protection of association impacts the permissible
scope of gang injunctions both in terms of geography and the range of
activity prohibited. The United States Supreme Court has
distinguished two lines of cases protecting the right to associate-
those protecting intimate relationships essential to safeguarding
individual freedom (intimate association), and those protecting
108. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 106, at 254.
109. A geographically broader injunction would not be necessary to prevent gang crime from
moving to neighborhoods adjacent to the target area. See Jeffrey Grogger, The Effects of Civil
Gang Injunctions on Reported Violent Crime: Evidence from Los Angeles County, 45 J.L. & ECON.
69, 81, 84 (2002) (finding that gang injunctions had statistically insignificant "spillover effects"
in the form of increased crime in adjacent neighborhoods).
110. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 766 n.3 (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629,
633 (1953)).
111. IRVING A. SPERGEL, THE YOUTH GANG PROBLEM: A COMMUNITY APPROACH 87 (1995).
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association to exercise First Amendment rights (instrumental
association). 112 The former strand stems from the "fundamental
rights" Substantive Due Process cases.113 The latter strand stems from
the First Amendment, as incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process clause.114
In Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of
Duarte, the Supreme Court explained that intimate associations
deserve constitutional protection because "the freedom to enter into
and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a
fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights."115
Such fundamental relationships include marriage, the begetting and
bearing of children, child rearing and education, and cohabitation with
one's relatives. 1 6  Where fundamental rights are at stake,
infringements of those rights must withstand the scrutiny of the
compelling interest test: the state must have a compelling interest in
regulating the activity, and the regulations must be narrowly drawn
to match that interest.11 7 The Supreme Court in Rotary Club left the
door open to protection of other intimate associations, besides family.
It suggested a test based on "factors such as size, purpose, selectivity,
and whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the
relationship."1 8 According to the Supreme Court in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, only groups that demonstrate "relative smallness, a
high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the
affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the
relationship" are "likely to reflect the considerations that have led to
an understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic element of
personal liberty." 1 9 Because of their large size and fluid membership,
groups like Rotary Clubs and the Jaycees do not qualify as intimate
associations. 120
112. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
113. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987)
(summarizing precedent finding a fundamental right to certain intimate associations).
114. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.").
115. 481 U.S. at 545.
116. Id. These are the same areas identified as "fundamental" in Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113,
152-53 (1973).
117. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. It is unclear whether such fundamental rights in this context
would also be subject to the "undue burden" analysis of Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (plurality opinion).
118. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 546.
119. 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
120. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 546; Roberts, 468 U.S at 621.
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The First Amendment protects instrumental association in
pursuit of various political, social, economic, educational, religious,
and cultural ends in order to protect individuals' rights to speak,
worship, and petition the government for redress of grievances. 121
Explicating the reasons for recognizing instrumental associational
rights, the Supreme Court wrote,
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial
ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.... It is beyond debate that freedom
to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable
aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which embraces freedom of speech.
12 2
These instrumental associational rights are not absolute,
however: "Infringements... may be justified by regulations adopted
to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of
ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less
restrictive of associational freedoms." 123 Furthermore, the First
Amendment does not protect those who would associate with others
"for the purpose of depriving third parties of their lawful rights.'1 24
1. Intimate Associational Rights and Gang Injunctions
Englebrecht's claims that the injunction burdened a protected
association because family members lived in the area fell on deaf
ears,125 but these arguments should not have been so lightly brushed
aside. As injunctions grow in area, from four square blocks in Acuna,
to one square mile in Englebrecht, to 6.6 square miles in the Colonia
Chiques injunction in Oxnard, the probability that the injunction will
affect gang members' interactions with their families grows. A larger
area increases the likelihood that more gang members will live in the
enjoined area, will have family who do, or both.
Although the California Court of Appeal in Englebrecht II
acknowledged that the injunction at issue might "place some burden
on family contact in the target area," the court concluded that "[the
injunction] by no means has, in our view, a fundamental impact on
general family association."' 26 The court's view is ill-considered, as
121. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
122. Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449, 460 (1958) (internal citations omitted).
123. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
124. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994).
125. See supra Part II.D.
126. People v. Englebrecht (Englebrecht I1), 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738, 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
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gang members are often related. 127 Whenever an injunction covers the
vicinity in which related gang members live, these family members
can no longer be seen together "in public view" in their own
neighborhood. 128 Associational provisions thus prevent related gang
members from eating together at the same restaurant, grocery
shopping together, driving each other to work or school, or performing
any number of typical family activities. "Public view" provisions, if
strictly construed, would mandate that related gang members keep
the drapes of their windows pulled shut if they are together in their
own home. 129 Even an exception for parents and children, like the one
found in the permanent injunction in Englebrecht 1I (left unaddressed
by that court), may insufficiently protect familial associational rights
and therefore fail to pass constitutional muster. For example, the
Englebrecht I1 exception does not on its face cover spouses, siblings, or
extended family in non-traditional living arrangements like those
protected by Moore v. City of East Cleveland.130 The Englebrecht 11
court is incorrect: these burdensome effects of an injunction certainly
do "fundamental[ly] impact" the family association of related gang
members. 131
Although injunctions can have an impact on constitutionally
protected association between family members, it is true that not all
gang members are family. Probably only a minority are. Arguably, if
only a small percentage of gang members are related, then the
127. See TERENCE P. THORNBERRY ET AL., GANGS AND DELINQUENCY IN DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE 78 (2003) (noting that in a study of Rochester, NY gangs, new gang members often
joined because their brothers or cousins were involved.); Avelardo Valdez, Toward a Typology of
Contemporary Mexican American Youth Gangs, in GANGS AND SOCIETY: ALTERNATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 12, 15 (Louis Kontos et al., eds., 2003) (stating that gang membership may be
multigenerational); Cheryl Maxson & Monica L. Whitlock, Joining the Gang: Gender Differences
in Risk Factors for Membership, in GANGS IN AMERICA III 19, 32 (C. Ronald Huff ed., 2002)
(reporting that a San Diego, CA study revealed that 73% of female gang members joined because
family members were involved in the gang.). See also Declaration of Neail Holland in Support of
Motion for Preliminary Injunction 54, People ex rel. Totten v. Colonia Chiques, No. CIV 226032
(Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2004) [hereinafter "Holland Declaration"] ("In some cases, one or both
parents [of gang members] were, or still are, gang members.").
128. E.g., Westside Injunction, supra note 5, at 2; Colonia Chiques Injunction, supra note 5,
at 2.
129. The California Supreme Court noted that gang members would be free to associate in
the enjoined area while out of public view but did not indicate what level of precaution the
defendants must take-for example, whether associating in an unfenced backyard or a hallway
inside an apartment building would be considered in "public view." Acuna, 929 P.2d at 616.
130. 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977). The Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance that would
prevent a grandmother from living in the same home as her two grandsons, who were first
cousins of each other, in a "single-family" zone of the city. The Court reaffirmed the idea of "a
private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
131. Englebrecht II, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758.
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injunction's impact on family association of gang members as a group
might be minimal. However, for those few gang members who are
related, the injunction imposes a significant burden. 132  The
Englebrecht II court asserted that "[a]ny attempt to limit the familial
association impact of the injunction would make it a less effective
device for dealing with the collective nature of gang activity." If
related gang members are a small minority, any exception to an
injunction's associational provision allowing family association would
necessarily ease the injunction's strictures only on a select few. It
would remain effective at preventing association between other gang
members, without unnecessarily infringing on family members'
associational rights.
Conversely, if a large number of gang members are related, the
Englebrecht 11 court's argument seems to gain more traction-if the
family member exception would apply to large numbers of gang
members, then the injunction would necessarily prevent less collective
gang conduct. Yet this hypothetical situation in which many gang
members are related begs the question whether the associational
provision is constitutional at all. If a large number of enjoined gang
members are related and live in the target area, the associational
provisions may well fail the compelling interest test's requirement of
narrow regulatory tailoring.133 An injunction that so greatly impacts
so many gang members' fundamental rights of association with family
is not "narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at
stake."1 34 Thus, such an injunction should be rewritten to forbid
association in furtherance of illegitimate nuisance activity, not
association generally. Eating at a restaurant with one's family is not a
public nuisance, but it would be barred by an absolute non-association
provision nonetheless.
2. Instrumental Associational Rights and Gang Injunctions
In its analysis of gangs' instrumental associational rights in
Acuna, the California Supreme Court relied extensively on Madsen v.
Women's Health Center, Inc.1 35 In Madsen, the United States Supreme
132. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992) ('The proper focus
of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom
the law is irrelevant.").
133. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (discussing the
requirement of narrow tailoring). Part III.D will address means of drafting associational
provisions that would more narrowly tailor an injunction to lessen its burden on familial
association without undercutting its overall effectiveness.
134. Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
135. 512 U.S. at 765 (1994).
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Court addressed anti-abortion protestors' challenges to the
constitutionality of an expanded injunction against their picketing
outside an abortion clinic.1 36 The demonstrators in Madsen contested,
among other things, establishment of a protest-free buffer zone around
the clinic1 37 and a provision prohibiting the use of "images observable"
from the clinic in their demonstrations. 138 They also argued that the
injunction's claim to apply to those persons acting in concert with
them violated their First Amendment freedom of association. 139
The Madsen Court determined that the injunction at issue was
a content neutral restriction on speech. Although the injunction was
effective only against pro-life protestors, there were no pro-choice
protestors obstructing access to the clinic; the obstructionist conduct of
the protestors-not the content of their protest-was objectionable. 140
The Court cautioned, however, that courts must be wary of
injunctions' greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application
compared to general ordinances.' 4 ' The Court therefore concluded that
the appropriate test for constitutionality is "whether the challenged
provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to
serve a significant government interest."' 42
Applying this test to the injunction in place at the clinic, the
Court concluded that the buffer zone protecting access to the clinic
was constitutional. 143 However, the court also determined that a buffer
zone shielding the rest of the clinic property (which was not necessary
for access to the clinic) burdened more speech than necessary. 144
Moreover, the court struck down the "images observable" provision,
because it did not limit itself to prohibiting the display of signs that
could be interpreted as threats or veiled threats against clinic patients
and their families. 145 As to the petitioners' freedom of association
arguments, the Court noted that "[t]he freedom of association
protected by the First Amendment does not extend to joining with
136. Id. at 757.
137. Id. at 768-71.
138. Id. at 773.
139. Id. at 776.
140. Id. at 762 ("To accept petitioners' claim would be to classify virtually every injunction as
content or viewpoint based. An injunction, by its very nature, applies only to a particular group
(or individuals) and regulates the activities, and perhaps the speech, of that group.").
141. Id. at 764.
142. Id. at 765.
143. Id. at 770.
144. Id. at 771.
145. Id. at 773.
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others for the purpose of depriving third parties of their lawful
rights."146
In the California Supreme Court's decision in Acuna, the
narrow geographical area covered by the injunction probably played a
role in the court's constitutional approval of the gang injunction under
Madsen's test. The enjoined area was clearly limited to the
neighborhood where the gang was a pervasive nuisance. At several
places in its opinion, the California Supreme Court referred to the
small area covered by the injunction. 147 In analyzing the burden the
associational provisions of the injunction placed on enjoined gang
members' First Amendment rights, the court wrote,
Outside the perimeter of Rocksprings the superior court's writ does not run; gang
members are subject to no special restrictions that do not affect the general population.
Given the limited area within which the superior court's injunction operates, the
absence of any showing of constitutionally protected activity by gang members within
that area, the aggravated nature of the misconduct, the fact that even within
Rocksprings the gang members may associate freely out of public view.., we conclude
that this aspect of provision (a) passes muster ... under the standard of Madsen.14 8
Following suit, the California Court of Appeal in Englebrecht I
approved the larger injunction at issue in that case, and similarly
emphasized that the target area at issue there encompassed only "the
turf of the Posole gang and the area that the gang has made a public
nuisance."1 49 Thus, California courts have concluded that blanket
associational provisions pass constitutional muster under Madsen
when areas targeted are limited to the neighborhoods in which the
gangs have made themselves a public nuisance and in which the
gangs are not actively engaging in constitutionally protected activity.
The courts give short shrift to considerations of gang members'
abilities to engage in protected instrumental association in the future.
Notwithstanding the contrary assertions of the California Supreme
Court in Acuna, the associational provisions typically found in gang
injunctions are broad enough that they potentially infringe on some
protected instrumental forms of association. The California Supreme
Court in Acuna concluded, "Manifestly, in its activities within the
four-block area of Rocksprings, the gang is not an association of
individuals formed for the purpose of engaging in protected speech or
146. Id. at 776.
147. For example, "The effect of provision (a)'s ban on defendants' protected speech is
minimal. To judge from the evidence placed before the superior court, the gangs appear to have
had no constitutionally protected or even lawful goals within the limited territory of
Rocksprings." People ex. rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 615 (Cal. 1997) (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 616.
149. In re Englebrecht (Englebrecht 1), 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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religious activities."'150 While it may be true that an enjoined gang
might not be engaged in protected activity at the time an injunction is
imposed, that circumstance does not change the fact that a broadly
worded injunction curtails all future collective protected speech,
political or religious activity within the enjoined area.
Under injunction provisions banning all gang member
association in public view, gang members would not be allowed to
petition the government as a group for redress of any perceived
grievances while they were within the target area of the injunction.
Gang members would not be allowed to stand in line together at a
polling place on Election Day while exercising their right to vote.
Situations where government buildings are located in the enjoined
area are especially problematic: the injunction against the Colonia
Chiques gang in Oxnard envelops both the Oxnard City Hall and
Oxnard Police Department buildings, effectively preventing gang
members from picketing their local government and law enforcement
agencies. 151 In most states, these constraints would be particularly
restrictive because persons subject to an injunction must obey it
(unless it is "transparently invalid") while they contest its legitimacy
in court.1 52
Provisions forbidding all association necessarily include
politically motivated assembly, thereby prospectively abridging gang
members' First Amendment rights-even if the enjoined defendants
were not using those rights at the time the injunction was imposed. A
larger target area further increases the burden on gang members'
instrumental associational rights; they must travel farther to
associate. Most problematic, however, is a case like the Colonia
Chiques in Oxnard, where the very houses of government are included
in the enjoined area and no amount of travel would allow direct
picketing of the institutions. When such essential constitutional rights
are at stake, the courts must carefully balance them under Madsen to
ensure that no more speech is burdened than necessary.
150. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 608 (internal punctuation and italics omitted) (citing Bd. of Dirs. of
Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987)).
151. Oxnard City Hall is located at 300 West Third Street, and the Oxnard Police
Department is located at 251 South "C" Street. Both addresses are within the enjoined area. See
Ventura County District Attorney, Colonia Chiques Gang Injunction Safety Zone Map,
http://da.countyofventura.org/coch/Injunction-SafetyZoneHandout.pdf (last visited Sept. 22,
2006).
152. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315, 317 (1967); see also DOBBS, supra
note 95, at 213 ("[T]he fact that an injunction is erroneously issued constitutes no defense to a
criminal contempt charge; the court's order must be obeyed until reversed."). However, this
"collateral bar rule" is not the law in California; contempt defendants may mount a jurisdictional
challenge to the validity of the underlying injunction. People v. Gonzalez, 910 P.2d 1366, 1375
(Cal. 1996).
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D. Recommendations
The physical boundaries of the area covered by a gang
injunction will generally be determined by equitable principles, not by
constitutional tests. Courts should therefore carefully balance the
hardships to the parties involved when considering the geographic
scope of the injunction, to make sure that the enjoined area is not
larger than it needs to be to prevent a public nuisance to neighborhood
residents. If the government has not demonstrated proof of a
cognizable risk of recurrent violation of residents' rights,153 an
injunction should not issue in that area. Courts should ensure that the
government carries its burden of proving the extent of the nuisance
through the entire area in which the injunction is sought. They should
emphasize that the standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence
must be met for an injunction to issue. 54
Considerations of constitutional rights should inform the
court's eventual injunction. The injunction's terms should be adjusted
in light of the rights at stake. Although a smaller enjoined area
imposes a lighter burden on gang members because it is relatively
easy to leave the area, a geographic solution to potential abridgements
of substantive constitutional rights is a blunt instrument at best. For
example, gang members who are subject to an injunction banning all
association with other gang members in public view and who have
family in the gang need protection for their intimate associational
rights. To protect these rights, one could draft an injunction that
physically excludes the gang members' homes from the enjoined areas.
This would safeguard the gang members' family association while in
public view on their property, but it would do nothing to protect
related gang members who want to go to a restaurant together.
Conversely, removing gang members' property from the enjoined area
would exclude from the injunction not just familial association on the
property, but non-familial, non-protected association as well.
To protect instrumental association, an injunction could
physically be drawn on the map to avoid government buildings, houses
of worship, and polling places, thereby permitting gang members to
petition the government, to worship, and to stand in line together
while voting. Such a map-based solution suffers the same imprecision
as the intimate association geographic solution above. It would
prohibit protected politically expressive association in other areas not
removed from the injunction's purview, at the same time that it would
153. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 766 n.3 (1994).
154. People v. Englebrecht (Englebrecht II), 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738, 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
20061 1717
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
potentially allow nuisance activities (those which are lawful when not
enjoined) to occur in the lands physically excluded from the
injunction's reach.
A more precise solution to the constitutional concerns
implicated by gang injunctions can be found by narrowing the scope of
the prohibited activities, rather than shrinking the enjoined area's
physical boundaries. It does not take much adjustment of injunction
terms to respect protected forms of association while still preventing
association in furtherance of the nuisance. Consider the need to
protect instrumental association for expressing political views. 155 An
injunction that prohibits all public association between gang members
in a broad geographic area probably violates the compelling interest
test's requirement of narrow tailoring because its prohibition includes
instrumental association. 156 Courts should consider how better to
tailor associational provisions. For inspiration, they can look to the
"images observable" provision struck down in Madsen.157 There, the
Supreme Court noted that the provision could have been drafted more
narrowly: the state could have enjoined "the display of signs that could
be interpreted as threats or veiled threats," rather than "all 'images
observable."' 158
Judge Iwasko's injunction 159 against two gangs in Lompoc
provides a good example of narrow tailoring analogous to the Supreme
Court's suggestion in Madsen. Rather than prohibit all public
association between enjoined gang members, his order prohibits
association "under circumstances that would warrant a reasonable
person to believe that the purpose or effect of that behavior is to
enable [the gang] and/or its Members to engage in the nuisance
conduct prohibited" by the injunction.1 60 By exempting conduct that
does not have a purpose or effect of perpetuating nuisance and by
imposing a reasonable person standard on the conduct, Judge Iwasko
noticeably lightens the burden on enjoined gang members'
155. Assuming that the California Supreme Court was correct to apply Madsen's "no more
speech than necessary test" to expressive association, courts must also examine their orders in
light of this test. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 616. Even if the California court was incorrect, applying the
test would be a sound policy choice (if not a constitutional mandate) that would aid a court in
narrowly drafting its orders.
156. It is a question for another day whether a provision banning all public association
within a very narrowly circumscribed area passes this test; however, one would imagine that if
the area were small enough (one square meter, for the sake of argument), then the requirements
of narrow tailoring would still be met.
157. 512 U.S. at 773.
158. Id.
159. Westside Injunction, supra note 5, at 1-2. Two gangs were sued in the same action,
resulting in identically worded injunctions addressed to each group individually. Id.
160. Id. at 2-3.
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associational rights-both intimate and instrumental. Gang members
in the same family who go grocery shopping together or who sit in a
coffee shop together would not appear to a reasonable person to be
engaging in public nuisance activity. Neither would gang members
assembling in public to petition their government peacefully nor
standing near each other in line at a polling place. Limiting the
associational ban only to conduct that furthers the nuisance refocuses
the court on the behavior that it seeks to prevent. Mere public
association is not harmful to the community by itself; rather it is the
destructive results that occur when gang members associate to engage
in nuisance activity together. 161 Because narrowly tailored terms
lighten an injunction's burden on gang members' liberties to associate
publicly, concerns about broad geographic scope are lessened. When
an injunction does not bind those people subject to it so tightly that it
prevents them from engaging in everyday activities, we need not be as
concerned with literally how far they must go to avoid its strictures.
IV. SUING GANGS AS UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS: EMPTY
COMPLAINTS?
A. A New Trend? Injunctions in Oxnard and Lompoc Do Not Name
Any Individual Defendants
In a public nuisance suit against a Latino gang in Oxnard,
California that resulted in a six square mile injunction, the Ventura
County District Attorney named the Colonia Chiques gang, as an
unincorporated association, and 500 Does as defendants. 162 A one
square mile injunction in Lompoc, California named two gangs alone,
with no individual defendants. 163 The Oxnard and Lompoc injunctions
could have been imposed as default judgments when no one appeared
in court to oppose them, 16 4 but the judges hearing the cases allowed
interveners to argue against imposing the requested injunctions. 16 5
After the injunction against the Colonia Chiques was imposed, police
161. See People ex. rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 615 (Cal. 1997) ("It is the threat of
collective conduct by gang members loitering in a specific and narrowly described neighborhood
that the [associational] provision is sensibly intended to forestall.") (emphasis in original).
162. Colonia Chiques Injunction, supra note 5.
163. Westside Injunction, supra note 5.
164. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 585 (West 2006) (default judgment statute); see also Bonnie
M. Dumanis, Office of the San Diego District Attorney, Gang Injunction Workflow Chart,
http://www.sdcda.org/protecting/gi-workflow.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2006) (explaining the
process of obtaining gang injunctions in California).
165. Westside Injunction, supra note 5; Colonia Chiques Injunction, supra note 5.
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began serving it on members of the gang, thereby binding them to its
terms. 166 The lack of notice to and service of process on members of the
gang before the imposition of the injunction-and the consequent
absence of an opportunity for gang members to contest it-drew
criticism. The Chief Deputy Public Defender for Ventura County,
California (who was allowed to intervene in the Colonia Chiques case)
opined, "This is a strange, novel process of getting a court order and
essentially leaving the name blank. And they allow the police to fill in
the name as the need arises."167 This Section will explore the practical
difficulties and constitutional procedural due process concerns that
arise from permitting gangs to be sued without naming any individual
defendants.
B. Gang Organizational Structure and the Impracticability of Service
and Defense
Although California law probably allows gangs to be considered
unincorporated associations, 168 gang organizational structure raises
several due process problems that would not as likely arise with other
varieties of unincorporated associations, such as political parties or
labor unions.1 69  While most legally recognized unincorporated
associations have designated officers-e.g., party chairmen, or union
presidents-most gangs do not.1 70 Many experts agree that gangs
(especially in "emerging gang cities" with less established gang
activity) are generally not very organized. 171 In particular, very few
gangs have a bureaucratic structure with a discernable hierarchy. 72
In a 1990 study of Los Angeles gangs, one sociologist concluded that
Mexican American gangs are "informally organized, without
166. Alvarez, supra note 12, at B1.
167. Catherine Saillant, Injunction on Gang Violated, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2004, at B1.
168. See supra Part II.B.
169. Political parties and labor unions are now often treated by courts as incorporated, but
early in the 20th Century, they were generally considered to be unincorporated associations.
Barr v. United Methodist Church, 153 Cal. Rptr. 322, 327 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); 41 CAL. JUR. 3D
Labor § 172 (2006).
170. For example, Detective Neail Holland described the Colonia Chiques gang thus: "[The
gang] is an unincorporated association. It consists of individual members with no formal
organization. As such, there is no president or vice president. There are associates, members,
OG's (old or original gangsters) and veteranos. There is no rank structure in the gang, and
because the gang is geographically so widespread, the members develop into smaller groups."
Holland Declaration, supra note 127, 379.
171. See James C. Howell et al., The Changing Boundaries of Youth Gangs, in GANGS IN
AMERICA III at 9 (C. Ronald Huff ed., 2002) (citing fifteen studies of gang organization).
172. WEISEL, supra note 16, at 55.
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acknowledged leadership ... ,"173 An organizational theorist also points
out, "[T]he proportion of contemporary gangs that may be considered
as 'more organized'. . . may reflect only a small percentage of
gangs." 174 Oxnard Police Department Detective and gang expert Neail
Holland described the Colonia Chiques as a "loosely knit organization"
in his declaration supporting the injunction.175
For lawsuits against unincorporated associations, California
law requires service on an officer or designated individual, 176 but the
lack of hierarchical organization in gangs makes it difficult to
determine who must be served with process. In this situation,
California law provides for service upon members generally: "[T]he
court or judge may make an order that service be made upon the
unincorporated association by delivery of a copy of the process to one
or more of the association's members designated in the order and by
mailing a copy of the process to the association at its last known
address."'177 If the gang itself does not have a "known address," it is
impossible to comply with statutory requirements for service of
process unless individual gang members are named in the order. If
they must be named in the order, then there is no reason why they
should not also be named in the complaint, since they ultimately will
be bound by any future injunction.
Ignoring this complication for a moment, if a group of gang
members are served on behalf of the gang but are not individually
named in the complaint, a collective action problem arises: each
member has an incentive to do nothing and to let other members
respond to the nuisance suit. If Member A does nothing, but Members
B and C successfully argue in court that the gang's conduct is not a
public nuisance, Member A gets the benefit of B's and C's action (no
injunction will be imposed) without having to pay any of the costs of
173. SPERGEL, supra note 111, at 78 (quoting Joan W. Moore, Gangs, Drugs, Violence, in
DRUGS AND VIOLENCE: CAUSES, CORRELATES AND CONSEQUENCES 160, 168 (Mario de la Rosa et
al., eds. 1990) (internal punctuation omitted).
174. WEISEL, supra note 16, at 55.
175. Holland Declaration, supra note 127, 53.
176. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 416.40 (West 2004) ("A summons may be served on an
unincorporated association ... by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint ... (b)
If the association is not a general or limited partnership, to the person designated as agent for
service of process in a statement filed with the Secretary of State or to the president or other
head of the association, a vice president, a secretary or assistant secretary, a treasurer or
assistant treasurer, a general manager, or a person authorized by the association to receive
service of process .... ).
177. CAL. CORP. CODE § 18220 (West 2006).
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defense. 178 Because Members B and C have the same incentives as
Member A, they will also do nothing, and the nuisance suit will
probably end up unopposed in court. 179 Highly involved gang members
may yet decide to stand up for the gang to which they are loyal, while
less involved members may refuse to act. This allows a district
attorney to select strategically which unnamed members of the gang
to serve with process. District attorneys who seek an easy path to an
injunction can simply serve one or a few peripherally involved gang
members in order to comply with the letter of the procedural statute;
they thereby can reduce the chances of opposition in court and
concomitantly increase the likelihood of winning an injunction by
default. 180
Further problems arise because unincorporated associations
have a legal existence separate from their members. As separate legal
entities, unincorporated associations must be represented in court by
an attorney.181 Assuming that the collective action problem described
above were overcome, if a purported gang leader were to try to
represent the gang's interests in court, he would be engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.18 2 Furthermore, California precedent
denies gang members the right to appointed counsel when the court is
considering imposing an injunction.18 3 Because any gang members
served on behalf of the gang cannot represent the gang as an
unincorporated association and the state will not provide them
counsel, they must hire an attorney in order to defend the gang in
court. This is an unrealistic expectation for two reasons. First, gang
members tend to come from lower economic classes and so it may be
178. Even if Members B and C fail in their defense and an injunction is imposed, A has spent
nothing on defense and is thus better off than B 'and C, who have expended resources and are
still subject to the same injunction.
179. This assumes that the members are rational actors.
180. This is not to impute an illegitimate motive to district attorneys seeking to enjoin gang
conduct, but rather to examine the nature of the incentives involved, without considering any
individual prosecutor's sense of fairness. However, in one case, a district attorney relied on the
fact that no individual gang members were named as defendants in the nuisance suit to argue
that a gang member who came forward to contest his inclusion in the injunction lacked standing
and should not be heard. Raul Hernandez, Injunction Ordered Against the Southside Chiques
Gang, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Sept. 19, 2006, at Al.
181. Clean Air Transp. Sys. v. San Mateo County Transit Dist., 243 Cal. Rptr. 799, 800 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1988); see supra Part II.B.
182. Clean Air Transp. Sys., 243 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01 (asserting that a layperson purporting
to represent a corporation is engaged in the unlawful practice of law, and that the same logic
applies to unincorporated associations).
183. See Iraheta v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 478 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding
that gang members do not have a right to appointed counsel unless they are at risk of losing
their liberty, i.e. during a contempt hearing.).
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impossible for them to afford an attorney.18 4 Second, if an individual
member does hire an attorney, that member's personal interest
diverges from the gang's collective interest in the litigation. Rather
than have their counsel argue that the gang as an association is not a
nuisance, the persons served have an incentive to claim that they are
not members of the gang at all.18 5
C. Procedural Due Process and the Constitutional Problem of Notice
1. The Requirements of Due Process
The practical problems of service and notice create
constitutional procedural due process problems.18 6 The United States
Supreme Court created a three-part balancing test in Mathews v.
Eldridge to determine whether procedural due process rights have
been abridged.187 First, a court must consider the nature and
importance of the individual interest at stake during the
proceeding.188 Second, it must consider the risk of an erroneous
deprivation or infringement of that interest under the current
procedures and the probable value of "additional or substitute
procedural safeguards." 18 9 Third, it must consider the financial and
administrative burdens on the government that the extra procedures
would require. 190 The Mathews test provides a general approach to due
process challenges to state procedures. 191
Issues of procedural due process particularly related to notice,
however, are analyzed according to the rule of Mullane v. Central
184. SPERGEL, supra note 111, at 60 ("Contemporary youth gangs are located primarily in
lower-class, slum, ghetto, barrio, or working class.., communities .... ).
185. In Acuna, two admitted gang members asserted that they had not personally
contributed to nuisance activity and therefore they should not be bound. People ex. rel. Gallo v.
Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 616-18 (Cal. 1997). Their interests diverged from the group's interest;
rather than argue that the gang was not a nuisance, which would benefit the gang as a whole,
they argued that they personally should not be bound. Their arguments were rejected. Id. at 618.
A claim of non-membership has the same effect, and highlights the same divergent interests in
the litigation.
186. The Due Process Clause reads: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
187. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1979). However, the Mathews test does not apply
in criminal or military cases. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992) (criminal); Weiss v.
United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (military).
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Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 192 Under Mullane, the appropriate
question is whether the notice given was "reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections." 193
The next Subsections apply procedural due process analysis to
different phases of a public nuisance suit brought against a gang as an
unincorporated association with no individually named defendants.
2. Application of Due Process Requirements
a. Upon Consideration of the Injunction: Whether an Enjoinable
Public Nuisance Exists
Naming an unincorporated association with no individual
members joined as defendants abridges gang members' procedural due
process rights when the court considers the propriety of a public
nuisance injunction. The Due Process Clause "at a minimum...
require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication
be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case."194 The notice must reasonably convey the
pendency of the action, and it must afford a reasonable time for
interested parties to make their appearance. 195 Efforts to provide
notice must be those one would use if reasonably attempting to notify
the absentee in the hopes that he would come forward; a "mere
gesture" is not due process.1 96 Still, the government need not go to
heroic efforts to notify a party, but merely must use means
"reasonably calculated" to apprise the party of the pendency of the
action. 197
Naming gangs as defendants without naming individual
defendants fails the Mullane test. When no gang members are named
in the suit and served with process at all, notice of the suit is not
"reasonably calculated" to apprise them of the public nuisance suit
against them.1 98 This is all the more apparent when one recognizes
that securing a gang injunction is a lengthy process during which the
192. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
193. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002) (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at
314).
194. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971) (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313).
195. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
196. Id. at 315.
197. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 170.
198. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (discussing the "reasonably calculated" standard).
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government learns much about the gang. Officials must assemble
crime statistics for the area in which the injunction is sought and
must gather and file sworn declarations by area residents. 199 The
process often takes months. During its course, the government learns
the names of at least some gang members. A gang expert ordinarily
gives a lengthy statement explaining the nature of the nuisance
conduct in the area targeted by the injunction.20 0 Details of crimes by
known gang members are often recounted to the court.201 When these
individuals are known to the government, it is a clear violation of
Mullane not to provide them with notice of the nuisance suit. Mullane
held that when names and addresses of those affected by a proceeding
are known, even notice by publication is inadequate; notice by
ordinary mail is required, at a minimum.20 2 Yet, by not naming
individual gang members in or notifying them about the pending
action, 20 3 the government denies them their constitutional rights.
Even when examining this stage of the litigation under the
more general Mathews analysis, 20 4 it is clear that gang members' due
process rights are violated. When the district attorney alleges that the
gang is engaging in public nuisance activities and asks for specific
conduct to be enjoined, the gang's collective liberty interest in
pursuing the enumerated activities (e.g. public association, wearing
gang-related clothing, etc.) is at risk. The liberty to engage in these
activities is highly important, as the Englebrecht II court noted, "not
because the personal activities enjoined are sublime or grand but
rather because they are commonplace and ordinary."205 Gang
injunctions' terms frequently enjoin everyday conduct that most
individuals take for granted; prohibitions on this conduct are therefore
especially onerous.
Proponents of the injunction might argue that, in the context of
Mathews balancing, the chance of an erroneous finding of a public
nuisance is low because it requires such a substantial effort by local
law enforcement to gather the data necessary to prove public
199. 48 declarations were gathered in Acuna. People ex. rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596,
601 (Cal. 1997).
200. E.g., Holland Declaration, supra note 127.
201. See, e.g., id. 379-888 (profiling many individual gang members by name).
202. 339 U.S. at 318.
203. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the impracticability of appropriate service of gangs as
unincorporated associations).
204. Mullane's more simply phrased test can be viewed as a specific application of the
Mathews factors to be used when analyzing notice. The Mathews factors can be helpful to decide
whether the notice given is "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
205. People v. Englebrecht (Englebrecht II), 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738, 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
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nuisance. Furthermore, under Acuna, in order for a public nuisance to
be found and enjoined, the government must show that the
interference with public rights posed by the gang's nuisance activity is
substantial and unreasonable. 20 6 Englebrecht 11 raises the standard of
proof beyond the typical preponderance standard of a civil lawsuit,
demanding proof of the nuisance by clear and convincing evidence. 20 7
These extensive requirements for obtaining injunctions seem to
indicate a low risk of error in finding a nuisance.
Such arguments are misplaced. Despite these procedures, the
risk of an erroneously issued injunction can be greatly reduced by
simply naming individual gang members as defendants and serving
them with process. When the gang is sued as an unincorporated
association and no individual defendants are named, it is unlikely that
anyone will appear to defend the gang in court.208 This is nearly
certain if no one is actually served with notice of the public nuisance
lawsuit. 2°9 Only one side of the story will be told. The sheer
impracticability of statutorily proper service to "the gang" as a lone
defendant denies individual members their right to notice and
hearing, yet these rights are "central to the Constitution's command of
due process. ' 210 The essential function of an adversary hearing is "to
ensure the requisite neutrality that must inform all governmental
decisionmaking."211 When the state presents its case without any
opposition, there is an elevated risk of an erroneously issued
injunction. 212
The cost of additional procedures to reduce the likelihood of
wrongly finding that a public nuisance exists is essentially non-
existent. Individual gang members must have notice of any injunction
against the gang in order to bind them to its terms;21 3 therefore, they
must be identified and served with process at some point. The police
could simply identify the gang members before the injunction is
imposed, instead of afterward. There is no reason to believe that it
206. People ex. rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 604 (Cal. 1997).
207. 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 753.
208. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the collective action problem and divergent interests
between the gang as an association and individuals served on behalf of a gang).
209. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the practical problems of serving a gang as an
unincorporated association).
210. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993).
211. Id. at 55.
212. It would seem from Boddie's dicta that imposing a default judgment after inadequate
notice would be unconstitutional. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
213. See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 910 P.2d 1366, 1368-69 (Cal. 1996) (finding that Gonzalez
was bound by the injunction because, although not a party to the action, he was a gang member
who had been served with the injunctive order).
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costs more to identify those subject to a potential injunction before the
injunction is imposed. Because the risk of an erroneous injunction
depriving gang members of basic liberties is high when gangs are sued
as associations and that risk can be substantially lowered at little cost
to the government merely by identifying and serving gang members
prior to any hearing, the procedural due process requirements of
Mathews have been violated when gangs are sued as unincorporated
associations without individually named defendants.
b. Service of Gang Members with the Injunction
Once an injunction against a gang as an unincorporated
association has been imposed,214 individual gang members are bound
to the injunction's terms after they are served with a copy.2 15 In order
to be served, of course, the police must identify them as gang
members. At this point, the interest at stake in the Mathews
balancing test is the liberty of the specific person served to engage in
the enjoined conduct. 216
The risk of misidentification as a gang member by the police is
quite high, especially if there are not clear standards for identification.
The California Court of Appeal in Englebrecht 11 created a definition
of "gang member" that, broken down into its essential elements,
requires that:
(1) there be an organization of three or more persons,
(a) which has a common name, sign or symbol, and
(b) which engages in nuisance conduct as a primary
activity, and
(c) whose members participate in the nuisance activity;21 7
and
(2) the individual, in order to be a "member," must
(a) participate or act in concert with the organization
(b) in a way that is more than nominal, passive, inactive, or
purely technical. 218
214. This Section ignores the procedural due process problems, discussed above, with
imposing the injunction against the gang in the first place.
215. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 910 P.2d at 1368-69 (discussing a gang member's conviction for
contempt after being served with an injunction).
216. This is distinct from the interest of the gang as an entity to engage in the conduct, as
discussed in the prior Section.
217. It is hard to imagine how such a group could possibly have nuisance conduct as a
primary activity if its members do not engage in the conduct, so this seems to be a redundant
criterion.
218. People v. Englebrecht (Englebrecht II), 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738, 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
("[A gang member is] a person who participates in or acts in concert with an ongoing
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For all its verbiage, this definition offers little to aid the police
in identifying gang members. It provides no guidance on what sort of
conduct would constitute acting in concert "more than nominally],
passive[ly], inactiveily], or technical[ly]." 219 It also does not expressly
mandate a nexus between the enjoined nuisance conduct and
participation with the organization. Under this definition, a person
who has played video games with gang members might conceivably be
a considered "gang member": he has acted in concert with members of
the gang (even though it was not in furtherance of the nuisance) and
that is all the definition strictly requires. A dearth of objective criteria
to legally determine gang membership under the Englebrecht 11
definition leads to a risk of erroneous identification by police.
220
This definition is probably also unconstitutionally vague. A law
may be unconstitutionally vague for either of two reasons: (1) it may
provide inadequate notice to enable ordinary people to understand
what conduct it prohibits; or (2) it may authorize or encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 221 In City of Chicago v.
Morales, the United States Supreme Court struck down Chicago's
anti-loitering ordinance, which prohibited remaining "in any one place
with no apparent purpose." 222 The ordinance was fatally flawed both
because it failed to give adequate notice of what conduct was
prohibited and because it permitted arbitrary enforcement,
"necessarily entrust[ing] lawmaking to the moment-to-moment
judgment of the policeman on his beat."223 The Englebrecht definition
of a gang member probably does not provide adequate notice of who
may be served with the injunction, because the definition's lack of
objective criteria against which to assess an individual's participation
with the gang makes it difficult for an individual to know whether his
or her association with the gang is "nominal, passive, inactive, or
organization, association or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having
as one of its primary activities the commission of acts constituting the enjoined public nuisance,
having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol and whose members engage
individually or collectively engage in the acts constituting the enjoined public nuisance. The
participation... must be more than nominal, passive, inactive or purely technical."). The
Colonia Chiques and Westside injunctions adopted this definition of "gang member." Westside
Injunction, supra note 5, at 2; Colonia Chiques Injunction, supra note 5, at 5.
219. Englebrecht II, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756.
220. It should be noted that police often apply their own independent criteria for determining
who is a member of a gang. Holland Declaration, supra note 127, 73-29. However, for the
purposes of an injunction, the only criteria that matter are those legally mandated or listed in
the injunction.
221. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999).
222. Id. at 51 n.14.
223. Id. at 61 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 360 (1983) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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purely technical."224 While this is problematic, the second prong of
unconstitutional vagueness-excessive delegation to police-is even
more so. Without objective criteria, police have free rein to determine
whose action in concert with gang members is "more than nominal,
passive, inactive or purely technical," much like they had absolute
(and unconstitutional) discretion to determine in Morales who was
remaining in one place "with no apparent purpose. '"225
Further increasing the difficulty of challenging one's
identification as a gang member, those persons served who wish to
contest their identification must also do so without the aid of
appointed counsel. 226 They must either hire an attorney (which might
present an impossible financial burden) or represent themselves.
Accurate identification at this stage is vital because once an individual
has been determined to be a gang member subject to the terms of the
injunction, that determination is not subject to collateral attack
during a contempt hearing. 227
Additional procedures would probably reduce the risk of
erroneous identification at little extra cost. Objective standards to
determine gang membership can increase accuracy of identification by
police on the street. The police in Englebrecht II did in fact use such
objective criteria to identify Englebrecht as a gang member; the court
approved of those criteria to the extent that they "employed those
concepts" articulated in the court's newly announced definition of gang
membership. 228 Objective criteria, such as a recent arrest while acting
with the gang, 229 having gang-associated tattoos, wearing gang-
associated clothing, and admitting membership in the gang, provide
concrete standards whereby police may assess whom to serve with an
injunction. 230 Such criteria would be relatively cheap to design and
promulgate. They would also increase the accuracy of who is identified
as a gang member and served with the injunction.
224. Englebrecht II, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756.
225. Morales, 527 U.S. at 61; Englebrecht II, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756.
226. Iraheta v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
227. Id. at 480; Englebrecht II, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 749. It is only at the contempt hearing
that the right to appointed counsel attaches because the defendant's physical liberty would be at
risk. Iraheta, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478.
228. Englebrecht II, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756.
229. A specific and relatively short time period could, and should, be identified to increase
the likelihood that the person arrested has not since dropped out of the gang.
230. It is true that these criteria are imperfect-tattoos may remain after gang membership
is terminated, "gang related clothing" might also be used to express support for a particular
athletic team, and an individual might dishonestly profess gang membership to seem "cool" to
peers-but they still provide more guidance than the test outlined by Englebrecht II. By clearly
articulating in the injunction what criteria the police are to use, those wrongly identified as gang
members can argue against their fitting specific criteria.
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Because the definitions and procedures in place falter under
both Morales's vagueness standards and under Mathews's general
test, due process analysis at this stage of the proceedings indicates
that more accurate procedures are needed to safeguard the rights of
those at risk of being served with an injunction.
c. Contempt Proceedings
Presently, contempt proceedings are the focus of most of the
attention in securing enjoined gang members' procedural due process
rights. Because contempt of court is a quasi-criminal offense,
punishable by fine or imprisonment, the physical liberty of the gang
member accused of violating the injunction is at stake. 231
The risk of an erroneous deprivation of the defendant's physical
liberty during a contempt trial is low. At contempt proceedings, there
is a full trial on whether the gang member violated the terms of the
injunction. 232 The State must prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt, like in any criminal trial, and the defendant has the right to
appointed counsel. 233 Because these procedures are as full as those in
any criminal case, there is no due process problem here.
D. Recommendations
Courts typically focus on contempt proceedings when
considering procedural due process issues and ignore due process
problems that arise earlier in the lawsuit. 234 Gang members'
constitutional rights are abridged by a lack of adequate notice when a
public nuisance suit is brought against the gang as an unincorporated
association without naming individual defendants. Suits that do not
name individual defendants violate due process at the imposition of
the nuisance suit, when the court is considering whether to issue an
injunction. 235 The government does not meet Mullane's requirement of
notice "reasonably calculated" to inform gang members of the
231. CAL. PENAL CODE § 166(b)(1) (West 1999).
232. See People v. Gonzalez, 910 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Cal. 1996) (describing contempt charges
against defendant and defendant's waiver of jury trial).
233. See Iraheta v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 478 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (stating
that when one's physical liberty is at stake, the state must appoint counsel to indigent
defendants).
234. See, e.g., id. (denying a right to appointed counsel until a contempt hearing); Gonzalez,
910 P.2d at 1373-76 (discussing how a collateral attack may be made on an injunction's validity
during a contempt hearing).
235. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (describing the factors that courts
must balance when deciding whether the requirements of due process have been met).
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action. 236 It costs the government nothing more in police resources to
identify the gang members to be enjoined before suing for an
injunction than it does to identify and serve those same gang members
after securing an injunction against the gang as an unincorporated
association. Courts should therefore find such lawsuits
unconstitutional on procedural due process grounds at this stage in
the proceedings. Individual gang members must be named as
defendants, regardless of whether the gang itself is named as a
separate entity.
Although equity permits the inclusion of clauses extending an
injunction's provisions to those acting in concert with the enjoined
defendants in order to safeguard the rights of the plaintiff,237 a core of
named individual defendants is needed to ensure fairness. Naming
even one individual defendant helps at least that particular gang
member to overcome one part of the collective action problem
identified previously;238 the individually named defendant knows that
he is being targeted specifically and is at risk of losing his liberty if he
does not act. Enjoining only the gang as an entity, and then using the
court's broad equitable power to prohibit acts by all its members
without giving them notice ex ante, is fundamentally unfair because it
denies gang members a chance to contest the imposition of the
injunction. Such an expansive use of injunctive power contradicts the
court's mission in equity: to balance the hardships of those involved
and achieve a just outcome.23 9 The state should be required to join as
many named defendants as practicable in the original complaint,
rather than relying on the court's broad equitable powers to enjoin all
collaborators. 240 Even though some gang members might not be named
(and therefore lack notice and the ability to contest the imposition of
an injunction personally), if a critical mass is named, those gang
members will effectively represent by proxy the other members'
interests in opposing the injunction.
236. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
237. Berger v. Superior Court, 167 P. 143, 144 (Cal. 1917).
238. See supra Part IV.B. The gang member will have an incentive to go to court but still has
an incentive to argue that he is not a gang member. Only when large numbers of gang members
are named and appear would the prudent strategy shift to arguing that no nuisance exists-it
would look foolish for a large number of gang members to appear and for all of them in turn
argue that they are not members of the organization.
239. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 106, at 254.
240. At a minimum, the state should name as an individual defendant any gang member
identified in a police expert declaration supporting the injunction. E.g., Holland Declaration,
supra note 127, 379-888 (profiling many individual gang members by name). Because the
police already know who these gang members are, the gang members deserve reasonable notice
under Mullane. 339 U.S. at 314.
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Naming individual defendants at the outset of the lawsuit
would appear, at first glance, to moot any procedural due process
concerns raised by erroneous identification as a gang member. 241 At
this stage, no injunction has been imposed, so there is not yet a risk of
depriving anyone of liberties; those who have been served can contest
their membership. However, this ignores the court's equitable power
to enjoin those acting in concert with or on behalf of the named
defendants. Unless the injunction is expressly limited to those
defendants named in the injunction and the court does not utilize this
power, there is still a risk of misclassification by the police as they
attempt to enforce the injunction against those acting in concert with
the named defendants. Once served, alleged members can contest
their identification in court, but objective criteria are needed in order
to clarify what evidence can be used to identify gang members and
justify binding them to the terms of the injunction. Therefore,
adoption of more definite criteria for identification of gang members
than those criteria found in Englebrecht II is advisable to ensure
compliance with the requirements of due process, even if a critical
mass of gang members is joined as individual defendants to the public
nuisance suit.
V. CONCLUSION
The criminal activities engaged in by street gangs
understandably strike fear in the hearts of those living in
neighborhoods afflicted with gang problems. Gang injunctions can
provide a sense of control and security for neighborhood residents,
who know that the authorities are monitoring the gang problem in
their environs. 242 The flexibility that injunctions provide to law
enforcement officials is particularly valuable because injunctions can
be adapted to the circumstances "on the ground."243 Every injunction
is different. This means, however, that it is impossible to impose
uniform standards on injunctions. Still, equitable and constitutional
principles must guide courts in tailoring their injunctions.
There is an impulse to expand the geographic scope of
injunctions to protect more territory from being claimed by a gang.
This Note has argued that increased geographic scope may be justified
by the area in which a gang actually engages in nuisance conduct, but
that courts must carefully balance the hardships to the parties as the
241. See supra Part IV.C.2.ii.
242. Cheryl Maxson, et al., "It's Getting Crazy Out There" Can a Civil Gang Injunction
Change a Community?, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POLY 577, 577 (2005).
243. People ex. rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 616 (Cal. 1997).
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scope of the proposed injunction expands. Constitutional concerns
about the heavier burden on liberties caused by greater geographic
scope can be mitigated by narrowly tailoring an injunction's
restrictions to the conduct that directly facilitates the public nuisance.
Properly tailored associational provisions can pass constitutional
muster.
Procedural due process problems caused by naming no
individual defendants, however, can be fixed only by ending that
practice. For constitutionally mandated procedural due process,
individual defendants must be named and served.
While this Note has suggested means to ensure the
constitutionality of injunctions in the face of new developments since
Acuna, it is ultimately up to the courts to police themselves. Trial
courts are in many ways the first and last line of defense with regard
to equitable limits on injunctions because appellate courts can only
review preliminary injunctions for abuse of discretion. 244 When
balancing the hardships to the parties in a public nuisance suit-the
abrogation of gang members' everyday liberties versus the
community's intimidation by gang activity-courts should remember
that equity is the ultimate goal. They should neither succumb to knee-
jerk, tough-on-crime reactions, nor overzealously guard the liberties of
those who would use them to oppress others.
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244. See id. at 607 (noting that its review is confined to whether the trial court "abused its
discretion").
* J.D. Candidate, May 2007, Vanderbilt University Law School. I would like to thank my
family for their support. I am indebted to Professor Thomas McCoy who provided feedback
throughout this Note's development and whose insights on constitutional law were vital.
Professor Richard Nagareda also provided valuable comments on a draft. Finally, special thanks
to my fellow editors of the VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW for their hard work and dedication. All
remaining errors are mine.
2006] 1733

